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UNBREAKABLE VOWS: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DIVORCE
MEG PENROSE*
First comes love, then comes marriage.
Then comes divorce.1
I. INTRODUCTION—LOVE AND MARRIAGE
A155.  C668.  To many readers these are mere numbers.  But, to same-sex couples that have waited years to solemnize their relationships,
these simple numbers have opened up a variety of rights and obligations.
Finally, same-sex couples can stand in line in New York, pull a number,
and for all intents and purposes be just like every other consenting, non-
incestuous couple in love.2  These couples can now legally wed and, in
states like New York, tap into many of the benefits that marriage affords.3
Marriage, after all, affords well over 1,100 federal rights.4  Marriage like-
* Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law.  Professor Penrose
dedicates this Article to her wonderful spouse whom she prays never utters the “D”
word.  She also thanks James Mitchell and the “Great State of New York” for its
forward thinking approach toward marriage.  While any errors in form or
substance are the author’s alone, this Article has greatly benefitted from
thoughtful comments provided by Professor Mark Tushnet, Professor Herma Hill
Kay, Professor Bernie James, Professor Judith Stinson, Professor Morgan L.
Holcomb, Professor Robert Spector, and Karen Stevens, as well as exceptional
research assistance from wonderful librarians, including Kris Helge and Laura
McKinnon.  Professor Eugene Volokh, Professor Michael Dorf, and Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky also contributed early guidance that helped shape the piece.  Special
credit also goes to my colleagues, Professors Sahar Aziz, Michael Green, Peter
Reilly, and Timothy Mulvaney.  Finally, this piece is a direct result of Dean Frederic
White’s loyal support of the Texas Wesleyan summer grant program.
1. Stevenson Swanson, Gays’ Breakups Raise Legal Conflicts: Custody, Visitation,
Assets Are Issues, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2004, at 9.
2. Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 95 (A. 8354) (McKinney),
codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-A (McKinney 2011) (codifying ability of same
sex couples to enter marriage).
3. See Kate Taylor, Over 10,000 Licenses Issued in First Year of Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2012, at A22 (remarking that number of same-sex couples marrying
might actually be higher because applicants are not required to report their sex on
marriage applications).  As many as 42% of total same-sex marriages performed in
New York during the first year of legalized marriage came from outside New York.
Id.  Approximately 35% of these couples returned home to other states in the U.S.
Id.
4. See Letter from the GAO to Senator Bill Frist (Jan. 23, 2004) (identifying
total of 1,138 federal marital benefits as of December 31, 2003).  An earlier GAO
Letter to Representative Henry Hyde had identified 1,049 federal laws where bene-
fits were tied to legal marriage. See Letter from the GAO to the Honorable Henry
J. Hyde (Jan. 31, 1997).  These rights include federal tax benefits, social security
benefits, employment benefits, medical benefits, death benefits, housing benefits,
(169)
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wise provides numerous state rights and benefits.5  But one right that re-
mains elusive to most same-sex couples is the right to divorce.6
For those that travel to partake of the right to marry in states like New
York or Massachusetts, returning home does not afford the same rights of
marriage dissolution that other non-gay couples enjoy.7  Ironically, in
states like Texas and Rhode Island, gay couples that are legally married
outside the state return home to be forever legally bound by their out-of-
state marriage, something non-gay couples never fear . . . or face.8
This Article considers whether there is a fundamental constitutional
right, through the liberty component of substantive due process, to di-
vorce.9  This right to divorce becomes particularly important for same-sex
couples whose marital rights are incomplete, at best.10  Surely, if divorce
were outlawed by any state, the masses would rise up against such tyranny
with cries that divorce must be constitutionally protected.11  But place di-
and other legal benefits and protections including the right to sue for wrongful
death, the right to claim marital privilege under evidentiary rules, and protections
afforded for domestic crimes and violence. Id.
5. See Jessica Bakeman, Same-Sex Marriage Legal for One Year—Watershed Moment
Celebrated in NY, STAR GAZETTE, July 24, 2012 (highlighting words of New York Gov-
ernor Cuomo referring to, “thousands of benefits and protections” gay couples
were previously denied under state law, “including health care and hospital visita-
tion rights, pension benefits, property ownership, inheritance rights and safe-
guards against loss or injury of a spouse”).
6. See Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
447 (2012).
7. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 8 (1996) (noting “[t]he general rule for deter-
mining the validity of a marriage is lex celebrationis—that is, a marriage is valid if it is
valid according to the law of the place where it was celebrated.”).
8. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 448 (“[T]he vast majority of married couples in
the United States can exit their marriage with relative ease.  Yet divorce is often
impossible to obtain in a growing number of cases—those where the two parties
involved in the divorce are of the same gender.”).
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognized as seminal
case establishing constitutional right to privacy).
10. Curiously, the United States House of Representatives found that securing
traditional marriage against the rising tide of divorce was less imperative than pro-
tecting marriage against same-sex infiltration. See H.R. REP. 104-664, at 14 (1996).
In summarizing the governmental interests necessitating DOMA, the House Com-
mittee acknowledged that “it will be objected that there are greater threats to mar-
riage and families than the one posed by same-sex ‘marriage,’ the most prominent
of which is divorce.  There is great force in this argument . . . .” Id.
11. See, e.g., GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 32 (1991) (trac-
ing history of divorce in early American life and culture).  Americans, as early as
the 1700s, “maintained that one party could flee from another if their union
lacked fulfillment and happiness.  Divorce-seekers also employed such terms as
‘tyranny,’ ‘misrule,’ ‘injustice,’ and ‘happiness of the individual,’ while espousing
revolution against unjust rule by a spouse.” Id.  Early sentiments toward divorce
often aligned with the revolutionary spirit found in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Id. at 31.  Professor Riley explains that Thomas Jefferson “related the con-
cepts of independence and happiness with divorce some years before he presented
a similar argument for terminating America’s connection with England in the Dec-
laration of Independence.” Id.
2
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vorce in the context of same-sex marriage and the response is predictably
more tepid.  “Those” marriages are not legal anyway, so what harm is there
in excluding them from divorce?12  States that refuse to recognize same-
sex marriage, for benefits purposes, can arguably refuse to recognize such
marriage even for the limited purpose of divorce—which requires, as a
predicate, a lawful marriage.13  This approach fails to appreciate the inte-
gral nature of divorce to marriage.
When marriages fail, as they have since the founding of our nation,14
people exercise their right to divorce and move on to new, healthier, hap-
pier relationships.15  Nearly 5,000 divorces are granted daily in the United
States.16  The reality remains that many Americans are married more than
once in their lives.17  Many individuals seize this opportunity on multiple
occasions,18 perhaps growing more convinced in their forever vows with
each subsequent marriage.19  But, can a state outlaw divorce and hold in-
12. See id. at 79 (analogizing marriages involving African Americans in stating
that because African Americans were not permitted to marry in many states, their
divorces—if any—were likely granted through the church rather than under
“white law”).
13. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 454 (appreciating that “divorce is fundamen-
tally different from marriage in that it terminates the familial relationship rather
than creates one, [thus,] states ought to grant same-sex divorces despite their inter-
est in refusing to grant or generally recognize same-sex marriages”).
14. RILEY, supra note 11, at 12 (analyzing history of divorce in early American
culture).  The first divorce was granted in Massachusetts Bay Colony to James
Luxford and his wife. Id.  Shortly thereafter, in 1643, Anne Clarke obtained a di-
vorce from her husband, Dennis. Id.  “Thus, divorce has been developing and
growing in what is today the United States for over three hundred and fifty years.”
Id. at 4.
15. See id. at 11.  It was the Puritans, ironically, that brought divorce to the
United States. Id.  The Puritans believed “that divorce would ultimately preserve
the institution of the family.” Id.  Puritans appreciated that unhappy marriages
could corrupt the social order and community.  As such, they permitted divorce as
a “safety-value.” Id.
16. Stinson, supra note 6, at 448.
17. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 173.  Professor Riley notes that many famous
Americans have had multiple marriages.  For example, Rita Hayworth, Richard
Pryor, Jane Wymann, and Tammy Wynette all had five marriages. Id.  Muhammad
Ali, Glen Campbell, Johnny Carson, Joan Collins, Doris Day, Kenny Rogers, and
Frank Sinatra were all married four times.  And, Dick Clark and Mary Tyler Moore
had three marriages apiece. Id.
18. See Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (Or. 1973) (upholding pre-
nuptial agreement between “middle-aged” spouses both of whom had been mar-
ried before).  The marriage approvingly dissolved under the terms of the
antenuptial agreement in Unander lasted “about nine months.” Id.
19. See, e.g., Wynonna Judd Marries for Third Time in Leiper’s Fork, THE TENNES-
SEAN (June 20, 2012), http://blogs.tennessean.com/tunein/2012/06/20/wy-
nonna-judd-marries-for-third-time-in-leipers-fork/.  In describing her third
marriage ceremony Ms. Judd indicated she “felt a joy that hasn’t been there
before.” See also RILEY, supra note 11, at 172 (noting that “most people about to
remarry believed their new marriages would last a lifetime.  Bridal consultants re-
ported that brides entering a third, fourth, or fifth marriage glowed with happiness
and optimism, and often insisted on a white wedding gown”).
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dividuals to their initial promise to the state and each other to be legally
bound ‘til death do they part?  Or, does the United States Constitution
afford relief from marriage for changed circumstances, including the sim-
ple desire to remarry someone else?
Numerous cases suggest there is a fundamental right to divorce.20
And, from a logical perspective, divorce appears to be an essential corol-
lary of marriage.21  Surely the state cannot force individuals to remain le-
gally bound, regardless of the words uttered during marriage
ceremonies.22  Marriage, and its bundle of rights, must assuredly include
not only an entrance, but also an exit.23  For many same-sex couples, this
traditional exit has been sealed, withheld, or otherwise thwarted.24  Ac-
cordingly, same-sex couples must convince courts that divorce is a funda-
mental right—not a right that states can withhold from discrete or
unpopular minorities.  The fundamental right to divorce provides the only
shelter from imposing unbreakable vows.
Section II of this Article briefly discusses the similarities between in-
terracial and same-sex marriage.  Section III exposes the uncertain status
of same-sex marriage in relation to divorce.  Section IV analyzes how
courts define fundamental rights under substantive due process.  Finally,
Section V applies this analytical framework to conclude divorce is a funda-
mental right.
States currently have the right to decide whether to sanction gay mar-
riage for purposes relating to marriage and marital benefits.  States retain
the right to limit marriage within their borders.  But, under no circum-
stances, can any state require a legally married individual to remain mar-
20. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) (reminding
that “[w]ithout those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure”); see
also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (securing as fundamental the right to
marry, and possibly remarry); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444–45 (1973) (distinguishing the divorce from bankruptcy,
particularly noting that “[t]he Boddie appellants’ inability to dissolve their mar-
riages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational
activities.”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (citing Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)) (explaining that “[m]arital status involves the regu-
larity and integrity of the marriage relation.  It affects the legitimacy of the off-
spring of marriage.  It is the basis of criminal laws, as the bigamy prosecution in
Williams v. North Carolina dramatically illustrates.  The State has a considerable in-
terest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of mar-
riages from being bastardized”).
22. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (“We know of no
community or society in which the public policy that condemned a husband and
wife to a lifetime of misery as an alternative to the opprobrium of divorce still
exists.”).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1973) (“The denial of
access to the judicial forum [for divorce] in Boddie touched directly . . . on the
marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establish-
ment and dissolution of that relationship.” (emphasis added)).
24. See generally, Stinson, supra note 6.
4
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ried.25  States cannot do so because divorce is qualitatively different from
marriage.  American divorce dates back to 1639 and has continued un-
abated, in varying forms and fashions, to provide relief from wedding
vows.26  This right cannot be withheld from same-sex couples while gener-
ously granted to all others.27  Such disparate treatment is not only uncon-
scionable, it is—this author believes—unconstitutional.
II. UNNATURAL UNIONS
“What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.”28
This common edict, one repeated during many marriage ceremonies,
contains the words of Jesus not Jefferson.29  Jefferson, it turns out, was an
early and ardent supporter of divorce.30  Many of his colleagues, including
Alexander Hamilton, proposed divorce legislation and supported the
right for early Americans to exit marriage.31  Hamilton’s 1787 proposed
New York statute allowing divorce solely on grounds of adultery remained
New York’s law until 1966.32  Early Americans became convinced “that di-
vorce was a citizen’s right in a democratic country dedicated to principles
of freedom and happiness.”33
In contrast, marital rights have often been withheld from certain, un-
popular groups.  Unlike divorce, the fundamental right to marry is of rela-
tively recent origin.  The fundamental right to marry, protecting most
men marrying most women,34 was not considered enshrined in our fed-
25. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 426–27 (1975) (upholding as constitu-
tional durational residency requirements to seek divorce).
26. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 12 (explaining that while variations for divorce-
seekers may have required some Americans to obtain legislative divorces while
others sought judicial divorces, divorce has been steadily consumed since the
founding of our nation).
27. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 458 (noting that “[i]n the last two decades,
some courts have granted divorces in cases where they would not have permitted
the marriage in the first place, including common-law marriages [which are not
recognized as legal in every state] and marriages of first cousins”).
28. Mark 10:9 (King James).
29. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 31.
30. Id.  Jefferson was a staunch supporter of divorce maintaining that to re-
fuse divorce is “to chain a man to misery till death.” Id.  He further noted that
“liberty of divorce prevents and cures domestic quarrels” and “restores to women
their natural right of equality.” Id.  Thus, while history credits Jesus with vigorously
opposing divorce, the words of Jefferson demonstrate a much more liberated view.
Id.
31. See id. at 157.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 34.
34. Throughout this Article, the author wants to make clear that when
describing marriage and its fundamental right, the author intends to mean those
legal marriages that are entered by two (and only two) consenting persons of ap-
propriate age, lacking in close or incestuous relation.  The United States Supreme
Court upheld a bigamy conviction against First Amendment challenge as far back
as 1878. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–68 (1878).  Polygamy, the
5
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eral Constitution until 1967.35  Its “sacred” pedigree in this country is a
mere forty-five years old.36  Compared to divorce, which began in earnest
during the colonial period, the right to marry is in its infancy.37  Prior to
1967, states could and, in fact, did prevent many men from marrying many
women.38  In particular, interracial marriage was illegal,39 often punished
by either prison40 or banishment,41 and deemed void by many of the indi-
Court noted, “has always been odious among the northern and western nations of
Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclu-
sively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.” Id. at 164.  The Court
continued, “we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State
of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society . . . .” Id. at
165.  While marriage rights and regulations vary from state to state and from gen-
eration to generation, there has not been any variation, or diminishment, in the
certitude that marriages to multiple partners at one time (bigamy and polygamy)
or marriages between close relatives is universally condemned. Id.
35. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  While Loving invalidated
state statutes and proscriptions against interracial marriages, the Supreme Court
did not strike down other exclusions against marriage including incest, bigamy,
polygamy, and same-sex marriage.  Additionally, all states continue to place legisla-
tive limitations on marriage relating to age.  Prior to Loving, the United States
Supreme Court had actually upheld anti-miscegenation statutes against Equal Pro-
tection challenges, refusing to overturn the convictions of a black man and white
woman for living together in adultery and fornication. See Pace v. Alabama, 106
U.S. 583, 585 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
36. Although the first case to strike down miscegenation laws as violating
Equal Protection was decided nearly twenty years before Loving, its holding ema-
nated from the Supreme Court of California, which only bound California.  Perez
v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
37. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 3 (“American divorce has a long and venerable
history: Puritan settlers first introduced it in the American colonies during the
early 1600s.  The resulting institution of American divorce was vital, and growing,
long before late twentieth-century Americans carried it to its current state.”).
38. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6–7 & n.5 (listing sixteen states that had miscegenation
statutes in effect when Loving was decided as: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia).  The Court in-
dicated also that Maryland repealed its miscegenation statute after Loving was initi-
ated. Id. at 6 n.5.  The Court also listed fourteen states that had repealed their
miscegenation statutes within fifteen years prior to Loving, including Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
39. See Kimberly A.C. Wilson, Some See Parallels in Gay Marriage Debate, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 25, 2004, at 5B (noting that Maryland is credited with first miscegenation
law in 1664).  “In the earliest days of Maryland history, the person who performed
a black-white wedding ceremony could be fined.  White servants who married
slaves and free Africans who married white servants were enslaved.” Id.
40. Jason Thomas, Love Divided, Reunited: Woman Who Gave Up Family to Marry
a Black Man Rejoices in Reconnecting with the Sister She’d Left Behind, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 25, 2005, at A1.  Indiana, which became a state in 1816, began outlaw-
ing interracial marriage two years later in 1818. Id.  In the early 1900s, the law in
Indiana provided that individuals violating the anti-miscegenation laws would be
“fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned not less than one
year nor more than 10 years.” Id.
41. In fact, the Lovings were essentially banished by Virginia when the state
trial judge suspended their one-year sentence for twenty-five years on the condi-
6
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vidual states.42  Such unions were deemed “unnatural,”43 among other
things.44  From 187145 to 192846 there were three Joint Resolutions to add
a constitutional amendment to prevent interracial marriage.47  All three
failed but set the stage for later federal attempts, including a failed consti-
tutional amendment, for taking plenary control over marriage and
divorce.48
Just as interracial marriage was deemed “unnatural” by courts and leg-
islators, the same emotive arguments are advanced to deny martial equal-
ity to same-sex couples.49  Several members of Congress have explained
tion that they “leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.”
Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
42. Id. at 4–5 n.3 (noting that Virginia statute at issue in Loving established all
“marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely void
without any decree of divorce or other legal process”).
43. Representative Seaborn Roddenbery asserted on the Capitol floor that
such interracial marriages were “revolting” “villainous” and “atrocious.” See 49
CONG. REC. 502 (1912); see also State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 245 (N.C. 1877) (noting
further argument “that a marriage between persons of different races is as unnatu-
ral and as revolting as an incestuous one”); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 484 (Okla.
1924) (“Statutes forbidding intermarriage by the white and black races were with-
out doubt dictated by wise statesmanship, and have a broad and solid foundation
in enlightened policy, sustained by sound reason and common sense.  The amalga-
mation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of deplorable
results.”).
44. Brian Powell, Marriage and the Court of Public Opinion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2010, at 37.  Mr. Powell, a sociologist at Indiana University, indicates that “[t]he
justifications now used to renounce same-sex marriage—that it is unnatural and
ungodly, that children from such unions will be irrevocably harmed, and that such
marriages degrade ‘real’ marriage—mirror objections to interracial
marriages . . . .”
45. See H.R.J. Res. 368, 62nd Cong. (1912).  The Joint Resolution was prof-
fered by Georgia Representative Roddenbery as follows:
Intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caucasians or any
other character of persons within the United States or any Territory
under their jurisdiction is forever prohibited, and the term “negroes” or
“persons of color” as here employed shall be held to mean any and all
persons of African descent or having any trace of African or negro blood.
Id.
46. See S.J. Res. 65, 70th Cong.(1928).  Senator Blease introduced the follow-
ing Joint Resolution:
The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto shall be unlawful
and void.  Congress shall provide by law for the punishment of parties
attempting to contract such marriage, and for the punishment of the of-
ficer of the law, or minister or any other person qualified to perform the
marriage ceremony, who shall attempt to or perform such ceremony.
Id.
47. Id.  All three Amendments failed to reach a vote in Congress.
48. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1707, 70th Cong.(1927) which provided a very detailed
description of marriage and divorce, including five permissible grounds for di-
vorce: adultery; cruel and inhuman treatment; abandonment or failure to provide
for a period of one year or more; incurable insanity; and conviction of an infamous
crime.
49. See, e.g., Tim Craig, Competing Md. Measures Would Focus on Gay Rights,
WASH. POST., Nov. 20, 2003, at B01 (discussing Maryland legislators’ views on same-
7
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their reasons for opposing same-sex marriage in terms, and tones, similar
to those raised during the anti-miscegenation period.  For example, Rep-
resentative Thomas Coburn remarked that he opposed gay marriage be-
cause it was “based on perversion,” and “unnatural.”50  Additionally,
Representative Stephen Buyer underscored that same-sex marriages are
“an attack upon God’s principles.”51  Senator Jesse Helms likewise ex-
claimed that “at the heart of this debate is the moral and spiritual survival
of this Nation.”52  Similar to the interracial couples that preceded them,
same-sex couples find themselves regularly targeted for constitutional
amendments to, once again, protect the sanctity of marriage from “unnat-
ural” influences.53
The Supreme Court of Hawaii addressed these vestiges of bigotry in a
very direct manner in its 1993 groundbreaking opinion, Baehr v. Lewin:54
[T]he Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage simply
could not exist because the Deity had deemed such a union in-
trinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had theretofore
never been the “custom” of the state to recognize mixed mar-
riages, marriage “always” having been construed to presuppose a
different configuration.  With all due respect to the Virginia
courts of a bygone era, we do not believe that trial judges are the
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving
amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or
not, that customs change with an evolving social order.55
While this Article does not intend to primarily focus on whether there
is a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, the fact that the
foundational arguments against gay marriage are eerily familiar to those
sex marriage).  As one Democratic state representative noted, “I don’t want to live
next door to people who have a same-sex relationship and have children and have
my children playing with them.” Id.
50. 142 CONG. REC. 16,972, 17,074, 17,082 (1996) (quoting Representatives
Buyer, Coburn, and Smith).
51. 142 CONG. REC. 17,074 (1996) (quoting Representative Buyer opposing
same-sex marriage legislation, describing it as inconsistent with traditional union
of “one man and one woman”).
52. 142 CONG. REC. 22,334 (1996).
53. One Supreme Court Justice, the Honorable Antonin Scalia, has explained
that being exposed to homosexuals can be uncomfortable for many people. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Many Ameri-
cans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners
in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s
schools, or as boarders in their home.  They view this as protecting themselves . . .
from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.”).
54. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  This one opinion, which served as the gateway
to subsequent same-sex marriage cases, served as the impetus for DOMA.  The
House Committee drafting DOMA explained that DOMA “is a response to a very
particular development in the State of Hawaii.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2
(1996).
55. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 (internal citation omitted).
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opposing miscegenation should be evaluated in assessing state actions
withholding marital rights—including, as this Article challenges—the cor-
relative, fundamental right to divorce.56
For states whose legislatures eradicated their anti-miscegenation laws
prior to Loving v. Virginia,57 there remained the thorny issue of whether
such interracial marriages would be recognized in neighboring states out-
lawing such marriages.58  What happened when those interracial mar-
riages, generally void under state miscegenation statutes, broke down?
Could states that outlawed interracial marriage still force such individuals
to remain married despite their deep desires to end the union?
Same-sex couples marrying today are facing the same dilemma.
Same-sex couples, legally married in one state, may return home to a fal-
tering marriage and an inhospitable court system.59  State courts are be-
ginning to struggle in earnest with the question—both jurisdictional and
substantive—of whether they have the power to award same-sex divorce.60
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is silent on this issue.61  While
DOMA precludes recognition of same-sex marriages, it does not outlaw or
otherwise delimit the right to petition for divorce.62  And, as this Article
contends, neither DOMA nor any state law could do so without running
afoul of the fundamental right of all persons to access the courts for disso-
lution of a legal marriage.
Curiously, though admittedly not identically, history has a way of re-
peating itself.  For those gay couples that find themselves legally married
56. Powell, supra note 44 (reminding that “[e]ven in 1967, when the [Su-
preme Court] issued its decision [in Loving v. Virginia], only one-fifth of Americans
approved of interracial marriage.  Yet public opinion soon changed, in large part
as a result of the [C]ourt[’s] decision.”).
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving remain the best example of not only
the refusal to recognize interracial marriage during the 1960s, but also the fact
that such unions were criminally prosecuted. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.  The State
of Virginia sentenced the Lovings to one year in jail but suspended their respective
sentences on the condition that they leave Virginia for a twenty-five year period.
Id. at 2–3.
59. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 460–61 (discussing difficulties of same-sex
couples in obtaining proper forum for divorce).
60. See id.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) (“No State, territory, or possession of the
United States . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State . . . .”).
62. Id.  In fact, the impetus behind DOMA was to prevent Hawaii from setting
a national requirement to recognize same-sex marriages as marriages for benefit pur-
poses under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEG-
ISLATION, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (“DOMA”), H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2
(1996) (acknowledging that DOMA “is a response to a very particular development
in the State of Hawaii”).  The Defense of Marriage Act does not speak either ex-
plicitly or implicitly to divorce. Id.  And, historically speaking, this is the first fed-
eral piece of legislation directed at marriage.
9
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in New York, what happens when they travel home to Texas?  Just as racial
minorities experienced prior to Loving, the answer is not entirely clear and
the reasoning hardly consistent.  Now, in the twenty-first century, the Su-
preme Court has the inescapable opportunity to firmly declare divorce is a
fundamental right.
III. UNCERTAIN STATUS
If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from
their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to
tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom.  Today many
people who have simply lived in more than one state do not
know, and the most learned lawyer cannot advise them with any
confidence.  The uncertainties that result are not merely techni-
cal, nor are they trivial; they affect fundamental rights and rela-
tions such as the lawfulness of their cohabitation, their children’s
legitimacy, their title to property, and even whether they are law-
abiding persons or criminals.  In a society as mobile and nomadic
as ours, such uncertainties affect large numbers of people and
create a social problem of some magnitude.63
Most individuals debating the gay marriage issue fail to appreciate
that marriage is only part of the equation.  Far too often marriage involves
not just the “coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,”
but also the dissolution of the marriage endeavor.64  While marriage is
usually a joyful occasion, divorce can be life-changing and financially ruin-
ous.65  Divorce is not always mutual and frequently not amicable.66  It is
the rending apart of a union, one that state courts alone can undo.67  If
this power is withheld, individuals remain married despite changed cir-
cumstances and, often, changed addresses.
So how do states treat individuals that leave the state to participate in
a destination wedding?  Can they return home from Canada, New York,
Hawaii, etc., to the protection of divorce, if needed?  Without the state
sanction of divorce, individuals would remain married to another—at least
in certain states and countries where their marriage is deemed lawful—’til
death do they part.  But, this dilemma only faces some individuals: the
63. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (referring to marriage
as “an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions”).
65. See, e.g., Estin, 334 U.S. at 542–50 (rendering New York separation agree-
ment protecting abandoned wife with monthly maintenance and support “divisi-
ble” from husband’s ex parte Nevada divorce).
66. See B.S. v. F.B., 883 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458–59 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (involving one
member of civil union serving other member with eviction notice).
67. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10
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same-sex couples that are quickly becoming the Mildred Jeter and Richard
Loving of the twenty-first century.68
Despite the belief that homosexuals desire marriage equality from
purely a status perspective, many gay and lesbian individuals desire mar-
riage for its opposite protection—divorce.  If a state refuses to recognize a
marital relationship for the limited purpose of divorce, the parties to that
relationship have no legal recourse when the feelings fade and the marital
framework falls apart.69  Marriage provides security precisely because
there is protection proffered, in the form of divorce, when that relation-
ship fails.  When you get right down to it, the push for marriage is not
about marriage at all.  It is about divorce.  Thus, the dialogue regarding a
marital equivalent, such as civil unions, is legally unacceptable.70  Without
marriage, many courts have found there can be no divorce.71  And, di-
vorce is a time-honored American tradition that ensures each party is pro-
tected when the union fails.72
A. Uncivil Unions
Gay couples that sought out and obtained legal “civil unions” under
Vermont state law learned very quickly that those unions could not be
easily dissolved.73
Individuals are now bringing these migrating marriages and civil
unions to court.  They seek divorces, dissolution and . . . benefits.
The dissolution cases present the classic conflict-of-laws problem.
Parties from a jurisdiction that offers civil unions, [sic] are now
domiciled in another state and want to dissolve the
relationship.74
68. See generally, Stinson, supra note 6; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
69. Stinson, supra note 6, at 455 (reminding that “State action is required in
order for a couple to lawfully terminate their marriage.  Despite the existence [in
some states] of common law marriage, there is no corresponding common law
divorce.” (footnotes omitted)).
70. See, e.g., B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 458–59.
71. Id. See also Austin v. Austin, 75 Va. Cir. 240 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008) (finding
Vermont civil union “void” for Virginia purposes only).
72. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888) (providing detailed history
of divorce dating back to country’s founding).
73. See Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498, *4 (Super. Ct. 2004) (pro-
viding equitable dissolution of civil union upon recognizing that “the parties are in
need of a judicial remedy to dissolve their legal relationship” but are not entitled
to traditional divorce); B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 463; O’Darling v. O’Darling, 2008 OK
71, 188 P.3d 137 (noting same result for Canadian marriage ceremony); Austin, 75
Va. Cir. at *2 (finding Vermont civil union “void” for Virginia purposes only).
74. B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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As two scholars aptly noted, these couples are “wedlocked.”75  The
Supreme Court of New York for Westchester County, a state trial court,
found that while “New York courts have recognized same sex [marital]
unions celebrated in a sister state or foreign country by application of the
principal [sic] of full faith and credit,” “the essential predicate for each
judicial determination is the existence of a valid marriage.”76  Thus, the
New York court, like many other courts dealing with civil unions—which
are not marriage relationships—found that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction, or statutory power, to render any dissolution.77  Simply put, the
couple could not divorce.
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, interracial couples faced a simi-
lar problem.  Their situation, however, was exacerbated by the virulent na-
ture of racial prejudice.  Interracial couples were not only disallowed the
martial bond,78 they were often subjected to criminal prosecution,79 and
extra-judicial punishments, for participating in such unions.80  Intemper-
ate invectives81 and rousing language82 were, and still are, cast about to
ensure that the majoritarian view will hold tightly to its purported God-
75. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, U. MIAMI L. REV.
1 (2012).
76. B.S., 883 N.Y.S.2d at 465–66 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 463–67 (finding dissolution of civil union impossible).
78. See, e.g., Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483 (Okla. 1924) (taking land from grant-
ees who obtained it from black husband of Choctaw Indian who had obtained land
after her death).  The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld not only the loss of
land by the grantees of the husband, but also required payment of money damages
because the purchaser should have known the husband had no rights to convey.
Id. at 487.
79. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858 (Va. 1878) (affirming Virginia trial
court’s conviction of black man for lewdly associating and cohabitating with white
woman despite couple’s legal marriage in neighboring D.C.).  The defendant was
fined $500, a rather significant sum in 1877. Id.
80. Eggers, 231 P. at 485 (“The marriage was unlawful and prohibited under
penalty of committing a felony, and, although contracted and sanctioned under
the laws of an adjoining state, it was void, and possessed none of the rights of
marriage under the laws of this state, and, this being the case, it was subject to be
passed on by a court of equity in a suit to quiet title . . . .”).
81. See 49 CONG. REC. 503 (1912) (supporting Representative Roddenbery’s
constitutional amendment against interracial marriage while using most strident,
intolerable language toward black Americans).  Representative Roddenbery spoke
of fearing the intermarriage of any “pure American girl . . . corrupted by a strain of
kinky-headed blood.” Id.  He preached, “your protection against the damning
blight of [Negro] blood in the veins of your descendants.” Id.
82. See id.  Rep. Roddenbery continued:
Intermarriage between whites and blacks is repulsive and averse to every
sentiment of pure American spirit.  It is abhorrent and repugnant to the
very principles of a pure Saxon government.  It is subversive of social
peace.  It is destructive of moral supremacy, and ultimately this slavery of
white women to black beasts will bring this Nation to a conflict as fatal
and bloody as ever reddened the soil of Virginia or crimsoned the moun-
tain paths of Pennsylvania.
Id.
12
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given monopoly on marriage, dismissing any right the “black-skinned,
thick-lipped, bull-necked brutal hearted African,”83 or the faggot84 and
queer85 might possess.86  All the while, those pushing most aggressively for
the exclusive heterosexual right to marriage based on sanctity of marriage
principles often have themselves enjoyed the privilege, protection, and
comfort of legalized divorce.87
83. Id.  Rep. Roddenbery further challenged “any man of wisdom and insight
into the future to assert that my language portends a more calamitous culmination
than a far-seeing statesman would prophesy.  Let us uproot and exterminate now
this debasing, ultrademoralizing un-American, and inhuman leprosy.” Id.
84. Matthew Biedlingmaier, Coulter: “I Don’t Think There’s Anything Offensive
About Any Variation of Faggy, Faggotry, Faggot, Fag”, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA
(Mar. 7, 2007, 7:02 PM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2007/03/07/coulter-
i-dont-think-theres-anything-offensive/138230.  Ann Coulter, a conservative pundit
unapologetically confirmed that she does not “think there’s anything offensive
about any variation of faggy, faggotry, faggot, fag”.  Ms. Coulter explained that her
earlier comments suggesting that “you have to go into rehab if you use the word
faggot” in relation to former Senator John Edwards were meant to be humorous.
Id.  She further indicated that the word, “faggot,” one she agrees is “a schoolyard
taunt,” is “a totally excellent word.” Id.
85. See John Peragine, Thousands Protest Pastor Charles Worley Who Preached Put-
ting Gays and Lesbians in Electrified Pen, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2012, 4:39 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/27/protesters-denounce-minis_n_1549
339.html.  A North Carolina Baptist minister presented a sermon wherein he
called for homosexuals to be fenced in.  The minister preached:
Build a great big large fence 50 or 100 miles long . . . .  Put all the lesbians
in there.  Fly over and drop some food.  Do the same thing with the
queers and the homosexuals.  Have that fence electrified so they can’t get
out.  You know what, in a few years, they’ll die out.  You know why?  They
can’t reproduce.
Id.
86. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E1320-21 (1996).  Representative Cardiss Collins,
whose personal explanation regarding her “no” vote to the Defense of Marriage
Act harkened back to the days of miscegenation: “As I walk past the Republican
side of the aisle, I expect to hear something similar to an old joke from the civil
rights era: ‘Some of my good friends are gay, I just wouldn’t want my son or daugh-
ter to marry one.’”
87. Many famous politicians and actors have both multiple divorces and mul-
tiple marriages.  Tom Cruise, an actor, has three marriages and three divorces.
Oddly, all three divorces were filed when his respective wives turned 33. See Elana
Grogan, Tom Cruise Divorced All 3 Wives When They Were 33, SOFTPEDIA (June 30,
2012, 4:51 PM), http://news.softpedia.com/news/Tom-Cruise-Divorced-All-3-
Wives-When-They-Were-33-278444.shtml.  Newt Gingrich, a national politician, has
had multiple marriages and multiple divorces. See Keith Ablow, Newt Gingrich’s
Three Marriages Mean He Might Make a Strong President—Really, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan.
20, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/20/newt-gingrichs-three-
marriages-mean-might-make-strong-president-really/.  Likewise, Rush Limbaugh, a
radio talk show host has had multiple marriages (four) and multiple divorces
(three). See William J. Doherty, Rush Limbaugh’s Wedding Ends a Bad Week for Mar-
riage, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 6, 2010), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/
marriage-and-parenting-in-todays-culture/201006/rush-limbaugh-s-wedding-ends-
bad-week-marriage.  Al Gore, a politician, has been married to his wife Tipper for
40 years but will soon be divorced. See Bonnie Miller Rubin & Rex W. Huppke, Al
Gore and Tipper Separate After 40 Years, CHI. TRIB. (June 1, 2010), http://articles.
13
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B. The Queer Issue of Same-Sex Divorce
In contrast to interracial struggles, perilously bound by criminal de-
crees and prosecutions, homosexual unions find disdain only at a visceral
or religious level.88  Since 2003, same-sex couples have enjoyed a constitu-
tionally-protected right to sexual intimacy.  Still, same-sex marriage is re-
pulsive to many and the rights relating to traditional marriage, including
divorce, are deemed to belong solely and exclusively to the heterosexual
community.  The public policy rhetoric denouncing same-sex marriage
does not explain why individuals, once legally married, should be denied
divorce.89  Whether the attempted suppression of same-sex divorce is
based on the refusal of sister states to provide comity or the DOMA’s nega-
tion of Full Faith and Credit, same-sex couples find themselves in an un-
tenable position: hopelessly and unyieldingly married for all time.  Same-
sex couples alone face the realization that their promises of “I do” are
unbreakable vows.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming appreciated this dilemma in permit-
ting a same-sex female couple to access divorce despite the lower court’s
finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.90
The court explained the critical distinctions between recognizing same-sex
marriage in the divorce context and more generally embracing homosex-
ual unions:
Specifically, Paula and Victoria are not seeking to live in Wyo-
ming as a married couple.  They are not seeking to enforce any
right incident to the status of being married.  In fact, it is quite
the opposite.  They are seeking to dissolve a legal relationship
entered into under the laws of Canada.  Respecting the law of
Canada . . . for the limited purpose of accepting the existence of
a condition precedent to granting a divorce, is not tantamount to
state recognition of an ongoing same-sex marriage.  Thus, the
policy of this state against the creation of same-sex marriages is
not violated.91
State courts throughout the country are struggling, as Wyoming did,
to apply their divorce paradigm to same-sex marriages.  The problem with
waiting for states to interpret their divorce laws in this burgeoning arena is
that, in the interim, same-sex couples are forced to remain legally wed,
thereby denying them the right to re-marry that their heterosexual neigh-
bors enjoy.  These couples are denied, forever, their right to access the state
chicagotribune.com/2010-06-01/news/ct-met-long-marriage-ends-20100601_1_tip-
per-gore-al-gore-divorce-and-separation.
88. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, ¶¶ 8–15, 253 P.3d 153,
156-57 (Wyo. 2011).
90. Id.
91. Id. at ¶ 13.
14
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court system—a scenario former Chief Justice Rehnquist noted may pose a
constitutional violation.92
State court decisions confronting same-sex divorce are not uniform
nationally, or even within a single state.93  Some states, like Texas, have
issued decisions finding that marriage and divorce are legally inseparable,
essentially finding that divorce is a component of marriage.94  And, since
same-sex marriage is unlawful in Texas, and void as against public policy,
divorcing such individuals is impermissible. 95  Other states, such as Rhode
Island, have found that the laws outlining divorce, predicated as they are
on the State’s marriage laws, “had in mind only marriages between people
of different sexes,” and thus the state can completely close its doors to
same-sex couples seeking marital dissolution.96  Finally, a Pennsylvania
Court denied access to divorce for a same-sex couple, noting that (1)
same-sex marriage is not a fundament right; and, (2) that these individuals
can petition to have their marriage deemed “void”—an inequitable result
that is not equivalent to, or engrained with the same protections, as di-
vorce.97  These conflicting approaches, particularly the Pennsylvania
court’s refusal to consider the appropriate fundamental right at stake—
divorce, not marriage—merely reinforce the need for consideration of di-
vorce as a fundamental right.98
The most recent state court opinion on same-sex divorce is Port v.
Cowan99 from the Court of Appeals of Maryland.  The Maryland court
found that same-sex divorce is not repugnant to the State’s public pol-
icy.100  The court found that based on the doctrine of comity, “long ap-
plied in our State, Maryland courts ‘will give effect to laws and judicial
decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but
92. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (recognizing potential issue
when individuals face “total deprivation” to access courts for divorce).
93. State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (dismissing appeal of
state’s challenge to granting of same-sex divorce because state lacked standing); In
re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no Equal
Protection violation for same-sex couple denied divorce).  Apparently, there are
some locations in Texas where same-sex couples can access divorce and others
where they cannot.
94. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 665 (finding that if Texas
courts were to give recognition to same-sex divorce petitions, rather than deny
them completely based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, “it would give that
petition some legal effect in violation of” state law).
95. Id. But see Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 21–22 (describing numer-
ous instances—outside context of same-sex marriage—where state courts have rec-
ognized void marriages for divorce purposes).
96. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 966 (R.I. 2007).
97. Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2010).
98. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 14 (arguing that courts claiming
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “over same-sex divorce because divorce is statu-
tory is . . . historically inaccurate”).
99. 44 A.3d 970 (Md. 2012).
100. Id.
15
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out of deference and respect.’”101  The decision is instructive in noting
the many instances where state courts recognize marriages performed
outside their boundaries for divorce purposes that are not legal inside
state boundaries, such as common law marriages102 and even certain in-
cestuous marriages.103
The comity argument, limited as it is to judicial discretion as to
whether a particular marriage violates public policy, is an insufficient pro-
tection for same-sex couples needing divorce.104  This approach exposes
gay couples to the same uncertainties faced by interracial couples before
Loving: am I married when I travel or move to another state?  More impor-
tantly, can I re-marry if I travel or move?  The uncertain status of same-sex
marriage, being legal in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont,
and Washington, is how these legally married individuals will be received
in other states, such as Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyo-
ming.105  From what the cases currently reveal, a same-sex couple married
in New York could divorce in Wyoming but not Texas.106  And a couple
legally married in Iowa can dissolve that union in Maryland, but not Penn-
sylvania.  This is precisely the scenario that plagued interracial couples for
years.  It is the very scenario that underscores the importance of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and casts a potential constitutional shadow over
DOMA.107
In each of these instances, the State’s refusal to provide access to di-
vorce for same-sex couples implicates that person’s subsequent right to
marry (or re-marry depending on whether the same-sex union would be
recognized) under Loving and Zablocki v. Redhail.108  Imagine, for exam-
101. Id. at 975 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. CAE–Link
Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 757 (1993)).
102. Id. at 976 (noting that while Maryland law prohibits common law mar-
riage, it recognizes such out-of-state marriages “if valid where formed”).
103. Id. at 977 (recognizing “for domestic law purposes a Rhode Island mar-
riage between an uncle and a niece”).
104. Compare id. (noting Maryland’s liberal recognition of valid foreign mar-
riages), with In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
105. But see Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 17 (explaining that “[f]orty-
nine states have subject matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce”).  Thus, the au-
thors continue, “state courts cannot [legitimately] refuse to hear same-sex divorce
petitions by asserting that they lack subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id.
106. In the heterosexual context, a similar scenario occurred in Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Haddock has since been overruled by the United
States Supreme Court.  Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
107. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 5 (“[R]efusing to allow same-sex
couples to divorce violates long-standing principles of equity and violates rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution.”).
108. 434 U.S.374 (1978). See also Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 38 (argu-
ing that “the right to marry implicitly entails a right to remarry that is not limited
to persons currently in opposite-sex marriages.  The right to divorce established in
Boddie is not only about ending the current marriage, but about enabling the par-
ties to marry again in the future” (footnote omitted)).
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/7
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR107.txt unknown Seq: 17 19-FEB-13 12:13
2013] UNBREAKABLE VOWS 185
ple, a female who legally married another female in New Hampshire (le-
gal, at least under the laws of New Hampshire) and desires to leave this
marriage and enter a new marriage with a male partner in Texas.  Her
right to marry that male partner is impaired by the State of Texas’s refusal
to grant her divorce.109  And, while Texas would gladly “void” the first
marriage, such declarations of voidness do not share the full spectrum of
rights and privileges as traditional divorce proceedings.110  In the truest
sense, voidness declarations are separate but far from equal.111  Following
Romer v. Evans,112 such disparate treatment may not only be unwise, it is
arguably unconstitutional.113
Make no mistake: one vital reason for securing State court recogni-
tion of gay marriage is to secure its dissolution.  These divorce-seeking
same-sex couples are not asking for the State to extend benefits or uphold
their union for marriage purposes.  On the contrary, same-sex married
couples vying for divorce merely need the state, the only entity capable of
dissolving the union,114 to recognize that in some other place a marriage
legally took place, that the receiving state—one where domicile and per-
sonal jurisdiction exist—has the power to dissolve.  No valid reason, espe-
cially under comity, exists to deny the existence of a same-sex marriage for
divorce purposes.115  In fact, it would seem the public policy arguments
levied against same-sex unions provide the exact support for encouraging
and sanctioning its dissolution.  Yet, recalcitrant state courts continue to
withhold their blessing of divorce, thinking that the matter is one of statu-
tory, rather than constitutional, dimension.116  This author believes state
courts can no longer do so without violating the fundamental right to
divorce.
IV. ORDERED LIBERTY, PRIVATE CHAOS—HOW COURTS DEFINE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific.  They did not presume to have this in-
sight.  They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
109. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 654.
110. Id. at 667.
111. The continuing problem with the treatment of gays and lesbians in the
marriage/divorce arena is the desire to give lesser names to their relationships
(“civil unions” versus marriage and “voidness declaration” versus divorce) while
ignoring that the stigmatic effect of such inferior amalgamations are only half as
damaging as the substantive distinctions.
112. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
113. See id.
114. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210–12 (1888).
115. See generally Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75.
116. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d at 654.
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generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, per-
sons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.117
If the “sanctity of marriage”—a phrase often invoked to exclude those
whom God and nature purportedly deem unfit for marriage—is the real
basis for excluding unrelated consenting adults from entering monoga-
mous marriages, what are we to make of society’s firmly established right
to divorce and the attendant right to remarry?118  Why is it that we do not
hear calls for a constitutional amendment banning divorce, in furthering
the sanctity of marriage?119
One possible answer is that ours is a government based on legislative
and constitutional pronouncements, not Biblical proclamations,120 thus
allowing millions of Americans, even pious ones, to celebrate their funda-
mental right to marry, divorce and, for many, remarry.121  In the United
States there is no limit to the number of marital partners an individual can
have, provided that the marriages are isolated and occur one at a time.122
117. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
118. Cf. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (noting “There can
be no doubt that the institution of marriage is the foundation of the familial and
social structure of our Nation and, as such, continues to be of vital interest to the
State; but we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the concept of the ‘sanctity’ of
a marriage—as being practically indissoluble, once entered into—held by our an-
cestors only a few generations ago, has been greatly eroded in the last several de-
cades.  This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the ratio of marriages to
divorces has reached a disturbing rate in many states; and that a new concept of
divorce—in which there is no ‘guilty’ party—is being advocated by many groups
and has been adopted by the State of California . . . .  With divorce such a com-
monplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that many prospective marriage partners
whose property and familial situation is such as to generate a valid antenuptial
agreement settling their property rights upon the death of either, might want to
consider and discuss . . . the disposition of their property . . . in the event their
marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail.”).
119. Committee Members during the DOMA presentation simply shrugged
off divorce by noting that “the fact that marriage is embattled is surely no argu-
ment for opening a new front in the [divorce] war.” See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at
15 (1996).
120. See Trickey v. Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (permit-
ting state-sanctioned divorce against wife’s wishes and her Biblical objections that
church marriage “‘according to God’s Holy Word’ . . . cannot be terminated by a
court or anything else but must exist until death”).
121. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 731 (Colo. 1982) (en banc)
(“Undeniably, some marriages would not come about if antenuptial agreements
were not available.  This may be increasingly true due to the frequency of marriage
dissolutions in our society, and the fact that many people marry more than
once.”).
122. In contrast to the modern antipathy toward same-sex marriages, pro-
scriptions against polygamy and bigamy have a much more solid and lengthy his-
tory.  State laws banning polygamy and bigamy as void marriages predate same-sex
proscriptions by hundreds of years. Compare Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341
(1890) (“And on this point there can be no serious discussion or difference of
18
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The fundamental right to divorce thus secures both the right to exit a
marriage and, equally important, the right to re-enter another.123
In contrast to the recent origin of the fundamental right to marry, a
pedigree spanning less than fifty years, the Supreme Court has been dis-
cussing divorce for over a hundred and fifty years. 124  In 1888, the Court
explained:
[W]hile marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions
of courts a civil contract, generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not re-
quire any religious ceremony for its solemnization, it is some-
thing more than a mere contract.  The consent of the parties is of
course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is cre-
ated which they cannot change.  Other contracts may be modi-
fied, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the
consent of the parties.  Not so with marriage.  The relation once
formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obliga-
tions and liabilities.125
This quotation underscores the critical nature of state action in al-
lowing the parties to be released from the marital contract.  The nine-
teenth century Supreme Court clearly appreciated that parties to a
marriage could not simply modify their relationship without state sanc-
opinion.  Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries.”), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003) (“It was not until the 1970’s that any State singled
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done
so.”).  While many modern opponents of same-sex unions speak to the founda-
tional nature of marriage as between one man and one woman, the truth of this
statement is more numeric (one and one) than it is gendered.  Legal prohibitions
against same-sex marriage are recent inventions, not traditional legal proclama-
tions like those against polygamy and bigamy whose history are as strong as incest.
See Davis, 133 U.S. at 341; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.  Thus, politicians and jurists
who suggest that same-sex proscriptions are identical to those of polygamy, big-
amy, and incest are simply historically incorrect.
123. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934) (upholding woman’s
subsequent marriage as valid after receiving divorce based on her adultery—di-
vorce which, at time, required her to refrain from remarriage).  Criminal adultery
laws were not the only penalty for, and protection against, adulterous conduct.
The statute involved in Loughran was the District of Columbia’s ban on remarrying
because, while divorce based on adultery was permitted, “in such case the innocent
party only may remarry.” Id. at 221–22.
124. See Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1869) (affording full faith and credit
to Indiana divorce).
125. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1888).
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tion.126  From the beginning of our country’s history, the State has held a
monopoly on an individual’s right to divorce.127
Despite the commonness of divorce in Supreme Court opinions, usu-
ally discussing the issue of divorce on the margins, the Court has never
squarely held that divorce is a fundamental right.128  The relatively few
marriage cases seem to focus on marital proscriptions such as polygamy
and miscegenation.129  Divorce related issues, including inheritance and
property disputes, on the other hand, have been commonly recognized
and resolved by the Supreme Court since the late 1800s—often in the Full
Faith and Credit context.130  Indeed, the divorce vernacular has been
more prevalent in the Supreme Court’s history than cases addressing mar-
riage.  From a constitutional perspective, divorce—more so than mar-
riage—seems historically demonstrated to have been “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty”131 such “that neither liberty nor justice would
exist”132 if divorce were withheld from all.  And, while it is universally
deemed true that marriage is exclusively within the states’ province, the
Court has been deciding rights tangentially relating to marital dissolution
for much of its history.
126. See id. at 211.  In citing a Maine case, the Court continued to focus on
the integral role of the state in marital dissolution:
When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they
have not so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the
rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon their agreement,
but upon the general law of the state . . . .  Their rights . . . are deter-
mined by the will of the sovereign, as evidenced by law.  They can neither
be modified nor changed by any agreement of parties.  It is a relation for
life, and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of
any contract they make.
Id. (citing Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481–83 (1863)).
127. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1971).
128. But see id. at 380–81 (holding that refusing indigent’s access to courts to
secure divorce violates Constitution due, largely, to state’s stranglehold on marital
dissolution).
129. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia’s misce-
genation statutes violate Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of Fourteenth
Amendment); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding district court of terri-
tory of Idaho had jurisdiction over crimes of bigamy and polygamy); Pace v. Ala-
bama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding Alabama’s miscegenation statute);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding indictment for bigamy in
territory of Utah).
130. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (upholding divorce
granted by Territory of Washington to husband who settled land and sought di-
vorce there after abandoning wife in Ohio); Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1869);
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858) (holding that wife divorced mensa et thoro in
New York can sue for unpaid alimony in Wisconsin, where former husband fled).
131. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977) (recognizing “the view that
some personal rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are so ‘funda-
mental’ that an undefined penumbra may provide them with an independent
source of constitutional protection.” (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969))).
132. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
20
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In the seminal personal jurisdiction case, Pennoyer v. Neff,133 the Court
reminded that the state “has absolute right to prescribe the conditions
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be cre-
ated, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”134  Thus, Pennoyer rec-
ognized that the right of marriage implicitly includes its correlative
opposite, the right to divorce.135  A mere ten years later, the Supreme
Court again addressed the issue of marital dissolution in Maynard v.
Hill.136 Maynard involved a wife’s equitable challenge to a Washington
State divorce issued in favor of the husband despite his having abandoned
her and their children without support in Ohio.137  The Court gave a
seemingly timeless explanation as to why couples seek divorce:
Many causes may arise, physical, moral, and intellectual, such as
the contracting by one of the parties of an incurable disease . . .
or confirmed insanity, or hopeless idiocy, or a conviction of a
felony, which would render the continuance of the marriage rela-
tion intolerable to the other party, and productive of no possible
benefit to society.138
And, in this particular case, the divorce was apparently brought on by the
husband’s very modern desire to simply marry another.139
Long before the Supreme Court recognized the importance of mari-
tal privacy and the sacrosanct nature of intimate decisions between con-
senting adults, the Court was already appreciating that the indispensable
synchronous right of marriage is divorce.140  The State, at least in
America, has always provided both an entrance into and an exit from mar-
riage.  The Puritans recognized that divorce fostered community harmony
because “[m]arriages had to be sound if the community was to be
sound.”141  The Puritans understood that “irremediable cases should be
eliminated by divorce.”142  While few Americans celebrate the idea of di-
vorce, we certainly appreciate the safety valve divorce provides.  It is like
seeing a lifeboat on a cruise ship.  Your hope is you never need it, but it is
133. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
134. Id. at 734–35.
135. Cf. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934) (upholding re-marriage
after female had been divorced due to her adultery).
136. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
137. Id. at 191–93.
138. Id. at 205.
139. Id. at 210 (noting “loose morals and shameless conduct of the
husband”).
140. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75, at 1 (“For as long as marriage has
existed in the United States, divorce has been its necessary opposite.”).
141. RILEY, supra note 11, at 11.
142. Id.
21
Penrose: Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR107.txt unknown Seq: 22 19-FEB-13 12:13
190 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 169
comforting to have it in sight.  And, since the first American divorce in
1639, that lifeboat has been omnipresent in our society.143
So, how does one successfully assert that divorce qualifies as a funda-
mental right under the Court’s substantive due process cases protecting
liberty and privacy interests with fundamental right status?  This author
believes that while the journey is not entirely linear, disjointed journeys
are often what have quilted together the Court’s fluid demarcation of all
fundamental rights.
While most scholars correctly assert that the personal right to privacy,
under substantive due process, originated with Griswold v. Connecticut,144
the language supporting Griswold and its progeny goes back much fur-
ther.145  The fundamental right to “liberty” and, ultimately, “privacy,” owe
their heritage to a string of decisions evaluating whether to fully incorpo-
rate, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights protections
against the States.146  These cases generally assessed criminal procedure
issues, such as double jeopardy and the right to be free from coerced con-
fessions.147  The quintessential language in determining whether a right
qualifies as a fundamental right under the Constitution stems from cases
as far back as the Court’s 1937 decision in Palko v. Connecticut.148
143. See id. at 12 (discussing first known American divorce between James
Luxford and his unnamed wife).  While “divorce” properly did not exist in every
colony or every state, some form of marital dissolution was available in every colony
and every state since our country’s founding. Id. at 1–61.
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536–41 (1942) (describing
procreation rights of person convicted for stealing chickens and of two separate
robberies as “human rights”). Skinner, an Equal Protection case, found that
Oklahoma’s law permitting sterilization of persons convicted as “habitual
criminals” violated “one of the basic civil rights of man.” Id. at 541. Skinner found
that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race.” Id.  Thus, in one short sentence, the Court began the process of
elevating the marital and procreative rights of Americans to fundamental status—
albeit, under the Equal Protection rubric at first.
146. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–26 (1937) (referencing Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
all as helping to create the test for rights deemed “the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty”). Palko, 302 U.S. at 323–26.  While these cases most certainly can-
not be credited with creating the modern “privacy” doctrine, as such, their heri-
tage is clear as the language of these cases has been cited in numerous modern
substantive due process cases ranging from Griswold to Roe.
147. For a further discussion of these cases, see supra note 146.
148. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969). Palko held that the right to be free from double jeopardy was not a right of
fundamental character. Id. at 328.  The Court asked, “[d]oes [the right to be free
from double jeopardy] violate those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’?” Id. (quoting Hebert,
272 U.S. at 316).  Finding the answer to “surely” be no, the Palko Court refused to
incorporate the Fifth Amendment’s proscription against double jeopardy to apply
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (noting Justice
22
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Palko instructs that there are certain inalienable rights that are so vital
as to be “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”149  To abolish
these rights, would “violate a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”150
The Palko inquiry—“[d]oes [denying a particular right] violate those ‘fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions’?”—has amazingly withstood the test of time,
though many of the decisions employing the Palko or Griswold tests early
on, including Palko itself, have not.151  Because the Supreme Court has
not directly addressed whether divorce qualifies as a fundamental right,
arguments in favor or against its application must carefully consider the
right to divorce under the Palko/Griswold paradigm.152
Griswold remains a staple in every introductory Constitutional Law
course.153 Griswold established a fundamental right to privacy,
“emanat[ing]” from the penumbral rights of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.154  The Court, in distinguishing its decision regarding issues relat-
ing to marital privacy from those touching mere economic problems,
found:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution
nor in the Bill of Rights.  The right to educate a child in a school
of the parent’s choice—whether public or private or parochial—
is also not mentioned.  Nor is the right to study any particular
subject or any foreign language.  Yet the First Amendment has
been construed to include certain of those rights. . . .  The right
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to
utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive,
the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought,
O’Connor’s statement that “for at least 105 years, . . . the [Fourteenth Amend-
ment] has been understood to contain a substantive component”).
149. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
150. Id. (citing Brown, 297 U.S. at 285; Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105; Hebert, 272 U.S.
at 316).
151. Id. at 328 (citing Hebert, 272 U.S. at 316).  Ultimately, Palko’s holding
regarding incorporation of the double jeopardy clause was reversed by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
152. But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–22 (1997) (sug-
gesting modern approach to “rein in” substantive due process).  Despite Gluck-
sberg’s seemingly restrictive language, the Court nonetheless references Snyder v.
Massachusetts and Palko v. Connecticut to outline the proper methodology for dis-
cerning whether a particular right qualifies for “fundamental right” status under
the Constitution. Id. at 720–21.  This author believes that while Glucksberg appears
to constrict the Court’s power to articulate “fundamental rights,” divorce, due to
its firm grounding in our country’s history and tradition, meets the exacting test
still analyzed under Palko and its progeny.
153. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. Id. at 484.  The famous concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg would
have, instead, entrenched the right to privacy in the Ninth Amendment. Id. at
486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
23
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and freedom to teach—indeed the freedom of the entire univer-
sity community.  Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.155
Griswold recognized, after canvassing the history of First Amendment
cases, that when combining the penumbral rights of the First, Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, one arrives at a legitimate “right of pri-
vacy.”156  While this First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth combination may be
scrutinized, and the concept of what truly emanates from the penumbras
remains subject to fair criticism, there can be no denying that marital pri-
vacy is “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school system. . . .  [I]t is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in [the Court’s] prior decisions.”157
Interestingly, the Griswold majority refrained from any reference to
earlier cases that utilized the traditional fundamental-rights-making lan-
guage.  The concurring opinions, however, buttressed their decisions by
focusing on whether the traditions and collective conscience of our peo-
ple indicated a principle that was so deeply rooted therein as to be ranked
fundamental.158  Focusing on marital liberties, Justice Goldberg reminded
that liberty gains content from both the emanations of specific constitu-
tional guarantees and “‘from experience with the requirements of a free
society.’”159  “The inquiry is whether a right involved ‘is of such a charac-
ter that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions’”160  Under this analysis, it is hard to deny that considering
the experience and requirements of a free society, divorce—much like
procreative freedoms—qualifies as a fundamental right.  Divorce is, in
fact, of such an important character that its access cannot be denied with-
out violating the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which we all
depend upon in making life’s most intimate decisions.161
Roe v. Wade,162 which established a woman’s qualified right to access
abortion, fortifies the notion that divorce qualifies as a fundamental con-
stitutional right.163  While the Constitution fails to explicitly mention “any
right of privacy,” the Court, “[i]n a line of decisions . . . going back per-
155. Id. at 482–83 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. at 482–85 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 486.
158. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
159. Id. at 493–94 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 493 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
161. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding law cannot
deny ability to divorce solely because of inability to pay).
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. See id. at 169.
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haps as far as” 1891 has recognized and supported such a right.164  These
decisions “make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fun-
damental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy.”165  “They also make it clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage.”166  This author
believes that divorce, much like procreation, contraception and child-rear-
ing decisions, is a right uniquely related to, but distinguishable from,
marriage.
Divorce, much like the decision whether to abort a pregnancy, in-
volves a choice that has far-reaching physical and mental health considera-
tions.167  Such choice, if withheld by the State may “force upon the
[individual] a distressful life and future.”168  “Psychological harm may be
imminent.”169  “Mental and physical health may be taxed” by being forced
to carry a child to term or, similarly, by being forced to remain in an un-
happy marriage.170
The Supreme Court has consistently focused on the fundamental na-
ture of intimate decisions, particularly those affecting family relations.171
In reaffirming the essential holding of Roe, Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey172 renewed the “promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter.”173  Marriage and rights corresponding to marriage were specifi-
cally referenced as underscoring this point.174 Casey specifically notes that
“[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education.”175  In summarizing the Court’s approach regarding
fundamental rights, Justice O’Connor notes:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these mat-
164. Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id. (emphasis added).




171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–49
(1992).
172. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
173. Id. at 847.
174. Id. at 847–48.
175. Id. at 851.
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ters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.176
The State, and the State alone, has the power to dissolve marital un-
ions.177  Unlike other contracts and family arrangements, the imprimatur
of the State upon a wedding license seals the exits for married couples
until, and unless, the State opens the emergency door leading to divorce.
Using the framework set out above, courts are left to ascertain through
“reasoned judgment” whether the right to divorce qualifies for fundamen-
tal protection.178  This author, considering the most recent Supreme
Court decisions at the intersection of life, love, and divorce, believes that
case law supports a positive answer to the query.
V. LIFE, LOVE, AND DIVORCE—THE ESSENTIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL
NATURE OF DIVORCE
People aren’t coming out to celebrate the right to divorce. . . .  But it may
turn out that the right to divorce is as important to celebrate as the right
to marry.179
The Supreme Court, starting in earnest with Griswold, has demarked a
particular line in the constitutional sand—marriage and the correspond-
ing bundle of martial rights are fundamentally protected under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 180  Cases that may be only tangentially related to
marriage, such as the right to choose how to educate your children, fall
squarely within the bundle.181  Likewise, the decision to engage in sexual
intimacy for the sheer sake of enjoyment has been included.182  And, so
too, has the decision whether to live with nuclear family members.183  Di-
176. Id.
177. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 9.
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.  Justice O’Connor majestically writes:
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims
may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts have always exercised: reasoned
judgment.  Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple
rule.  That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices
with which we disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the
duties of our office.
Id.
179. Kathleen Burge, For Gays, Divorce May Soon Be a Useful Right, BOS. GLOBE,
Dec. 3, 2003, at B1 (quoting Professor Suzanne Goldberg of Rutgers School of Law
in Newark).
180. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing mar-
riage-related rights cases such as Loving, Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, and Casey).
181. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
182. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
183. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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vorce seems to be similar to these rights from both a qualitative, and con-
stitutional, perspective.
A. Love
In a very real sense, the Supreme Court has given broader protection
to our ability to love whom we choose within the last fifteen years.184  Be-
ginning with Romer v. Evans in 1996, the Court held that a Colorado con-
stitutional amendment singling out gay and lesbian individuals for
differential treatment, including potential access to housing, employment
and state courts, was irrational and constitutionally unacceptable.185  Us-
ing Equal Protection, Romer struck down the amendment because it sin-
gled out a particular class of persons, homosexuals, and “impose[d] a
special disability upon those persons alone.”186  Colorado was unable to
provide sufficient justification for its classification, prompting Justice Ken-
nedy to remark “that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects.”187  Colorado sought to justify its exclu-
sionary amendment on the grounds that it respects “other citizens’ free-
dom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”188
This reasoning harkens back to the anti-miscegenation period where hotel
operators and restaurants could exclude persons based on their race
alone.189  Just as many state laws during anti-miscegenation times found
support in White Supremacy and contempt for racial minorities, the Colo-
rado statute seemed to be based on similar notions of hegemony and
disdain.190
Romer, even limited as it was to preventing states from singling out
discrete minority groups for maltreatment and ostracism, fortifies the ar-
gument that divorce is a fundamental right that cannot be denied based
solely on a person’s minority classification.  Surely if states were to outlaw
184. Two areas where the Court has not varied its limitation on even consen-
sual intimate conduct are incestuous relationships and polygamous relationships.
185. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
186. Id. at 631.
187. Id. at 632.  Justice Kennedy and the six-member majority were willing to
apply rational basis to the classification.  But, Colorado was unable to meet even
this miniscule standard.  The Court found “[t]he breadth of the amendment is so
far removed from [the state’s proffered interests] that we find it impossible to
credit them.” Id. at 635.  “We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.” Id.
188. Id.
189. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding, under Com-
merce Clause, that restaurant could not exclude blacks from its interior seating);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (requiring, on
basis of Commerce Clause, motel operator to allow blacks access to their motel).
190. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classi-
fies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal
to everyone else.  This Colorado cannot do.  A State cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws.”).
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divorce solely for the mentally or physically handicapped, there would be
outrage.  And, case authority suggests that such a law would be struck
down as failing even the minimal rational basis test.191  But, this author
believes that the right to divorce is stronger than merely an Equal Protec-
tion claim.  Instead, the right, like the right relating to all marital-issues,
should find shelter under the substantive due process cases granting the
protection of strict scrutiny review to fundamental rights.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, no longer can
same-sex couples be prosecuted for their consensual intimate acts.192
Lawrence was to sodomy laws what McLaughlin v. Florida193 was to anti-mis-
cegenation laws.194  Sexual intimacy is first protected.  Then, those rela-
tionships where sexual intimacy naturally occurs receive protection.  In
this manner, interracial couples first received protection for sexual inti-
macy in McLaughlin.  Shortly thereafter, in Loving, interracial couples re-
ceived the constitutional right to marry.195
The tide has clearly turned and the modern trend that Justice Ken-
nedy relies upon in Lawrence suggests that acts of sexual intimacy are in-
creasingly becoming part of the intimate associational rights protected
under the Constitution.  While a strong argument can be made that the
right to divorce stems from our constitutionally-protected rights to sexual
autonomy or our associational rights, this Article is more narrowly fo-
cused.  Divorce is, or should be, a free-standing fundamental right, much
like the opposing right to marry.
It is unclear whether Lawrence elevates same-sex intimate conduct to
fundamental right status.196  In fact, it is hard to appreciate how the law is
191. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(holding in unanimity to strike down city’s attempt to withhold special use permit
from home for mentally handicapped after finding decision was based on irra-
tional prejudice).
192. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).  Interestingly, the
Justices that were in the majority in Romer were the same Justices that participated
in the majority opinion of Lawrence.  Likewise, the three dissenting Justices in
Romer, Justices Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas, also dissented
in Lawrence. See id. at 586.
193. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
194. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.  To be clear, Lawrence considered the right to
sexual intimacy under substantive Due Process grounds while McLaughlin was an
Equal Protection case.  Despite this salient difference, the two cases both eradicate
criminal prosecutions for consensual acts of sexual intimacy where the lone “ille-
gal” criteria was either race or sexual orientation.
195. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  While some scholars suggest
that marriage and domestic relations have always been the province of state courts
and legislatures, Loving assuredly proves this is not the case. Loving demonstrates
the federal government’s plenary power over marriage—particularly when states
attempt to withhold marital rights from couples deemed unfit for marriage by the
majority.
196. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (deciding in case which involves “two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in a sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle. . . .  Their right to liberty under the Due Pro-
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invalidated or what level of constitutional scrutiny is actually being ap-
plied.197  Justice Scalia issued a scathing dissent, more vigorous than his
Romer dissent,198 in which he claims now that laws outlawing fornication,
masturbation, and bestiality will be subject to legal challenge.199  And,
while Justice Scalia fails to cite a single authority supporting the existence
of any statute criminalizing masturbation, his point that the Court has now
extended constitutional protection to all consensual, adult and non-inces-
tuous sexually intimate conduct is well-taken.200
Justice Scalia presciently suggests that Lawrence opens the door to le-
galizing gay marriage.201  Justice Scalia is undoubtedly viewing the evolu-
tionary trajectory of Romer and Lawrence202 through the prism of
McLaughlin203 and Loving.204  The first step to achieving a constitutional
right to interracial marriage was to eradicate the underlying criminal con-
cess Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without interven-
tion of the government.”).
197. While Justice Kennedy and the majority rely on substantive due process,
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion would find an Equal Protection violation,
similar to McLaughlin. Id. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  But, despite ana-
lyzing the case under the right to liberty, and seemingly finding such right to exist,
Justice Kennedy and the majority never apply the exacting strict scrutiny analysis
familiarly associated with fundamental rights.  Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent
correctly notes the ambiguity of the majority’s opinion. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (noting that “[n]ot once does [the majority] describe homosexual sod-
omy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty interest,’ nor does it subject
the Texas statute to strict scrutiny”).
198. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that, rather than respectfully dissenting as so many Justices have historically
done, Justice Scalia stated: “I vigorously dissent”).
199. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against big-
amy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornica-
tion, bestiality, and obscenity are . . . called into question by today’s decision”).
200. Justice Scalia’s Lawrence dissent is rich in irony.  In Romer he criticized
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for being “so long on emotive utterance and so
short on relevant legal citation.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Yet,
in Lawrence, Justice Scalia speaks of the vulnerability of fornication, masturbation,
and bestiality laws without offering a single statute or case application where mas-
turbation (performed in private) has been criminally condemned and prosecuted.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Court’s
“reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples”).  In supporting his argument that same-sex marriage laws are now
vulnerable, Justice Scalia notes that societal feelings that certain conduct is im-
moral and unacceptable “is the same justification that supports many other laws
regulating sexual behavior that make a distinction based upon the identity of the
partner—for examples, laws against adultery, fornication, and adult incest, and
laws refusing to recognize homosexual marriage.” Id. at 600.
202. See id. at 604 (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homo-
sexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”).
203. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 185 n.1 (1964) (striking down state
statute criminalizing the “occupying same room” at nighttime or living together of
interracial couples).
204. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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duct often relied upon by states to support its proscription.205  The syllo-
gism was simple: interracial sex is criminal, sex is part of marriage; hence,
interracial marriage must also be criminal.  With that syllogism fatally
wounded in McLaughlin and eventually struck down entirely in Loving, the
predicate has indeed been drawn for same-sex marriage.  Scalia fears, per-
haps not altogether unjustified, that the proverbial slippery slope toward
gay marriage has been fully lodged open by Lawrence.206
For purposes of this Article, however, the importance of both Romer
and Lawrence is the fact that these decisions grant same-sex individuals
some measure of protection before the law.207  In Romer, the protection is
grounded in Equal Protection.208  In Lawrence, the protection is more en-
igmatic, though excepting the failure to apply strict scrutiny analysis, Jus-
tice Kennedy gives strong indication that consensual sodomy is now a
protected “liberty” interest under substantive due process.209  Homosexu-
als, contrary to the querulous urgings of Justice Scalia, are not the same as
bigamists or polygamists.  For literally centuries the Supreme Court has
drawn a clear distinction between those desiring to marry multiple part-
ners and those desiring consensual intimate privacy.210
205. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In a very telling para-
graph, Justice Scalia compares the Court’s direction with our northern neighbors,
Canada.
One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people
rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry
things to their logical conclusion.  The people may feel that their disap-
probation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosex-
ual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual
acts—and may legislate accordingly.  The Court today pretends that it
possesses a similar freedom of action, so that we need not fear judicial
imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in
Canada . . . .
Id.
206. See id. at 599 (asserting that Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all
morals legislation” (emphasis added)).  Justice Scalia further faults the majority for
signing “on to the so-called homosexual agenda . . . .” Id. at 602.
207. Despite Justice Scalia’s virulent dissents containing inflammatory lan-
guage in both cases, these cases do indeed exempt same-sex individuals from their
previous “affiliation” or grouping with incestuous and polygamous relationships.
208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“Central both to the idea of
the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance.”).
209. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (couching protected right as right to liberty
under Due Process Clause).
210. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890) (stating “[b]igamy and
polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries.  They are
crimes by the laws of the United States, and they are crimes by the laws of
Idaho. . . .  To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense
of mankind”).
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Despite the rhetoric211 and false analogies,212 including those prof-
fered by Justice Scalia,213 homosexuals are no longer in the same legal
position as incestuous and polygamous couples.  Nothing that occurred in
either Romer or Lawrence overturned the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Reynolds v. United States214 or Davis v. Beason215 finding state laws banning
bigamy and polygamy constitutional.  Putting to the side the hyperbolic
analogies drawn by Justice Scalia, the rights of gays and lesbians to partake
in most fundamental rights relating to associational intimacy are now con-
stitutionally stronger.  Strong enough, one wonders, to include divorce?
B. Life
To qualify a “right” as fundamental, various elements must be satis-
fied.  In 1997, when the Supreme Court addressed whether assisted sui-
cide was constitutionally protected, many scholars believed the Court had
finally retreated from its liberal treatment of fundamental rights that be-
gan with Griswold.216  Because the Court’s decision in Washington v. Gluck-
sberg217 suggests a shift in direction, consideration of this case becomes
imperative in discussing any potential fundamental right.218  While as-
sisted suicide might not, at first glance, have much to do with divorce, the
common thread is whether certain intimate behavior qualifies for funda-
mental right status.
211. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not know what
‘acting in private’ means; surely consensual sodomy, like heterosexual intercourse,
is rarely performed on stage.”).
212. See id. at 599 (arguing that “the same interest furthered by criminal laws
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” under-
lie decisions to criminalize intimate conduct of private, consenting adults).  These
comparisons are poorly supported, completely lacking citation or case authority,
and are, respectfully, equally lacking in logic.  States prohibit bestiality to protect
animals, as animals can never consent to such conduct.  States prohibit adultery to
preserve the sanctity of marriage, a viable state interest completely removed from
same-sex intimate conduct.  Likewise, states prohibit bigamy to protect the sanctity
of marriage and secure inheritance and other marriage-related rights.  These cate-
gories, which are convenient to group together, do not share the similarities that
Justice Scalia, without citing any authority, represents. See id.  And, ironically, Jus-
tice Scalia engages in precisely the same approach he condemned in Romer, draft-
ing an opinion with “heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than
judicial holdings.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing laws relating
to homosexuality as similar to other reprehensible conduct—such as murder, po-
lygamy, and cruelty to animals); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (analogizing homosexual
conduct to bigamy, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity).
214. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
215. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
216. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997).
217. 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
218. Id.
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In contrast to sexual intimacy issues, the Supreme Court has held that
individuals do not have a liberty interest in assisted suicide.219  In Gluck-
sberg, the Court began by evaluating whether the right to assisted suicide
“has any place in our Nation’s traditions.”220  Even at this starting point,
courts can easily distinguish the right to assisted suicide from divorce.
Contrary to divorce, countries have long proscribed and condemned sui-
cide.221  “Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an
increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, [so-
ciety has] not retreated from this prohibition.”222  It was against this his-
torical backdrop, considering tradition and practice, that the Supreme
Court refused to extend any liberty interest to assisted suicide.223  Unlike
divorce, the Glucksberg Court was:
[C]onfronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition
that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly
to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent
adults.  To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centu-
ries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the consid-
ered policy choice of almost every State.224
Divorce, in numerous variations, is available in all fifty states.225  In
fact, historically only one state, South Carolina, has ever proscribed di-
vorce and, even then, the ban was temporary.226  Divorce has been widely
available to most Americans since the 1960s, when Ronald Reagan, then
California Governor, signed the Nation’s first no-fault divorce bill into
219. See id. at 735–36 (rejecting claim that assisted suicide provides liberty
interest capable of declaring Washington law prohibiting practice
unconstitutional).
220. Id. at 723.
221. See id. at 719.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 723.
225. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that “[b]y 1970, every state in the
union permitted divorce”).
226. See id. at 69–70 (pointing out that while South Carolina did not permit
divorce during nineteenth century, South Carolina law did permit husbands to
leave up to one fourth of their estates to mistresses); see also id. at 156–57 (describ-
ing how South Carolina began permitting divorce through South Carolina Divorce
Act in 1949—nearly two decades before United States Supreme Court recognized
marriage as fundamental right).
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law.227  Since that time, divorce has been readily and easily available.228
Prior to that time, divorce may have required proof of cause, but that
proof was generally easy to provide and equally easy to achieve.229  Divorce
has the near opposite pedigree of assisted suicide.  While assisted suicide
has been universally condemned, divorce has been regularly offered and
voraciously utilized.230  While assisted suicide has been outlawed, divorce
has been a legal part of American existence since the country’s found-
ing.231  In this regard, divorce stands on much firmer constitutional foot-
ing than assisted suicide.232
Many scholars agree that Glucksberg constricted the Court’s ability to
establish “fundamental rights” under substantive due process.233  Yet, the
Court’s language is tempered by its actual decision-making process in both
Glucksberg and, subsequently, in Lawrence.  Both opinions focus almost sin-
gularly on the historical practices of our country.234  Thus, courts analyz-
ing the character of an asserted fundamental right to divorce must begin,
like Glucksberg, by considering “whether this asserted right has any place in
227. See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 406 (2007) (noting that “[m]ost writers date the
transformation of divorce law in the United States to the 1960s, when New York
revised its antiquated divorce statute and California adopted the nation’s first pure
no-fault divorce law”). See also RILEY, supra note 11, at 163 (remarking that by 1977,
a mere three years after California introduced no-fault divorce, all but three states
had adopted the non-adversarial system).
228. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that after California introduced
no-fault divorce law, many other states followed suit).  “By the early 1980s, one out
of two marriages ended in divorce.  By the end of the decade, Americans divorced
at the rate of over one million divorces a year—one every 13 seconds.” Id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 9 (noting that “divorce gained a firm foothold in the several
parts of America by the outbreak of the Revolution in 1776”); see also id. at 34
(“[D]uring the early 1830s, divorce was already widespread”).  A German commen-
tator labeled the United States “the leading divorce country of the Western World”
in 1956. Id. at 184.  Thereafter, “in 1971, an American historian prophesied that
‘divorce in the land of the free will continue to be as American as apple pie.’” Id.
231. See id. at 3–4.  Ironically it was the devout Puritan settlers that established
the first divorce laws and decrees in America in the early 1600s. Id. at 3.
232. See id. at 55.  Professor Riley, while tracing divorce back to the Puritan
settlers, appreciated that by the middle of the nineteenth century, “it was clear that
the time-honored pledge of ‘true & faithful until death’ had little long-term value
to many people who had recited to their spouses on their wedding days.” Id.  In
fact, by 1850, “[d]ivorce was now firmly entrenched in the laws of most states and
territories.  Also, growing numbers of Americans had accepted the concept of di-
vorce as a right: that people suffering abuse or tyranny at the hands of mates were
justified in seeking their personal freedom.” Id. at 61.
233. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (admonishing
Supreme Court must show caution and exercise restraint in rendering new funda-
mental rights “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly trans-
formed into the policy preferences of the [m]embers of this Court”).
234. Id. at 720–23; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568–71 (2003) (“At the
outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country of
laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”).
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our Nation’s traditions.”235  In the case of divorce, our nation’s traditions
provide unequivocal support for fundamental right status.236
C. Divorce
Couples marry.  Couples divorce.  As tragic as it sounds, this is the
American love story.237  Or, at least this is the American love story for mil-
lions and millions of Americans dating back to our country’s earliest
days.238
The Supreme Court has, however, never directly held that divorce is a
fundamental right.239  Most of the Supreme Court’s decisions relating to
divorce continue to both recognize and uphold the right of divorce with
an almost conspiratorial appreciation that the right exists—as a “right.”
The Court has regularly rendered decisions impacting, upholding, and
otherwise protecting divorce as a viable institution.240  The Court’s two
most recent decisions implicating divorce are Boddie v. Connecticut241 and
Sosna v. Iowa.242
Boddie can be considered either an access to the courts case or a case
protecting indigents, much like Zablocki in the marital realm.  In 1971, the
Court concluded that divorce is far too important to relegate, wholly, to
individual state control.243  Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan ex-
plained the Court’s reasoning in striking down a Connecticut filing fee in
divorce cases:
235. Id. at 723.
236. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 3–8.  Even the great Alexander Hamilton
sponsored a divorce statute in 1787. Id. at 157.
237. See id. at 5 (observing that “Americans, a people who love weddings, ro-
mance, and living happily ever after, [have] generated the highest divorce rate[s]
in the world”).
238. Id. at 11 (“Before migrating to the colonies in 1620, many Separatists
embraced Martin Luther’s and John Calvin’s belief that marriage and divorce were
civil concerns.”).  The first American divorce involved a Puritan couple in Massa-
chusetts in 1639. Id. at 12.  Shortly thereafter, in 1641, the first alimony statute
appeared—also in Massachusetts. Id. at 15.
239. See Leonard P. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C. L.
REV. 935, 978–83 (1981) (focusing, as this author does, on states’ monopolization
of divorce process in suggesting that divorce is fundamental right).  “A state’s cate-
gorical refusal to grant divorces would, of course, be tantamount to both a denial
of procedural access and a substantive legal right.” Id. at 983.  Professor Strickman
argues that a state’s “categorical refusal to do so is a restriction on liberty of a
magnitude which demands strict scrutiny.” Id.
240. See generally Estin, supra note 227.  Professor Estin notes that while Boddie
does not establish, conclusively, a fundamental right to divorce, “it linked divorce
to other familial rights protected by the Constitution and described divorce pro-
ceedings as ‘the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.’” Id. at 427
(footnote omitted) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376, 386
(1971)).
241. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
242. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
243. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
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Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage
relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values and the concomi-
tant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this
relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.244
Despite the language focusing on an individual’s ability to pay, the
bulk of the opinion focuses on the due process right of all individuals to
access the courts.245  Such access becomes increasingly important in the
situation of divorce because state courts provide “the only avenue to disso-
lution” of marriage.246  This monopoly of power evokes due process con-
cerns—certainly procedural, but also, this author believes, substantive in
nature.247
The Boddie Court admitted unawareness “of any jurisdiction where
private citizens may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state
approval.”248
Even where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we
know of no instance where two consenting adults may divorce
and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal ob-
ligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the pro-
hibition against remarriage, without invoking the State’s judicial
machinery.249
Thus, divorce is qualitatively unique and mandates some added mea-
sure of due process protection for all individuals seeking access to di-
vorce.250 Boddie goes only as far as necessary to decide the issue directly
before the Court, but the reasoning and language suggest that any individ-
ual seeking divorce must, at a minimum, “be given a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard.”251  Precluding access to the only doors available to
dissolve a legal marriage undoubtedly implicates due process concerns.252
Boddie intimates, without holding, that states cannot foreclose an entire
244. Id.
245. Id. at 375–82.
246. Id. at 376.
247. See id. at 377 (noting that for all persons divorce process “is not only the
paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one”).
248. Id. at 376.
249. Id.
250. See Stinson, supra note 6, at 22 (“Very little is required to marry; a simple
application and certification from the state will suffice.  But judicial intervention is
required to divorce, and the state should not eliminate the ability of people to
access that judicial process.” (footnotes omitted)).
251. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377.
252. See id. at 379 (explaining that “a State must afford to all individuals a
meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process
Clause”).
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group, based either on economics or orientation, from accessing
divorce.253
The opinion’s final paragraph provides the strongest rationale for
finding that divorce is a fundamental right protected not only by procedu-
ral due process but, also, by substantive due process:
The requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial pro-
cess is entirely a state-created matter.  Thus we hold only that a
State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on it by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt
the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.254
The Court’s use of the phrase “all citizens” is telling.  A generous
reading of Boddie requires acknowledgement that the States’ monopoly on
divorce impacts federal concerns.  In resolving divorce requests, states do
not operate entirely outside constitutional restraint.  Some federal limits,
it appears, are acceptable in the realm of divorce.
Sosna is not inapposite. Sosna upheld a one-year durational residency
requirement prior to petitioning for divorce.  Iowa’s one-year residency
requirement is easily distinguishable from other right to travel cases be-
cause the state’s interest in divorce requires that individuals be “genuinely
attached to the State.”255  This attachment helps “insulate divorce decrees
from the likelihood of collateral attack.”256  A durational waiting period,
however, is vastly distinct from the exclusion—for all time—from the
state’s divorce courts.257
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, clarified the constitutional
distinction between Sosna and Boddie:
[T]he gravamen of appellant Sosna’s claim is not total depriva-
tion, as in Boddie, but only delay.  The operation of the filing fee
in Boddie served to exclude forever a certain segment of the pop-
ulation from obtaining a divorce in the courts of Connecticut.
No similar total deprivation is present in appellant’s case, and the
delay which attends the enforcement of the one-year durational
residency requirement is . . . [therefore] consistent with the pro-
visions of the United States Constitution.258
253. Id. at 380–81 (“[T]he State’s refusal to admit these appellants to its
courts, the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be regarded as
the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed
right to a dissolution of their marriages . . . .”).
254. Id. at 383.
255. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 (1975).
256. Id.
257. See id. at 410.
258. Id.
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Thus, were a state to forever exclude “a certain segment of the population”
from accessing divorce, it is unlikely the Court would turn a blind eye to
such deprivation.259  Rather, the Court’s language suggests that this right
is subject to delay, but not complete denial.
When these cases are considered together, in light of the settled crite-
ria for recognizing fundamental rights, a viable argument can be made
that divorce qualifies as a liberty right under substantive due process.  No
more important rights attend to marriage than the rights to both enter
and exit the relationship.  Divorce is an unfortunate, but necessary, pre-
rogative in our American society.260  People treasure their right to enter a
legally binding marriage union.  In fact, gays and lesbians continue to bat-
tle for marital equality at both the state and federal level.  While that strug-
gle is important for a myriad of reasons, the battle for divorce is equally
important—lest homosexuals win the battle only to realize they have lost
the war.
VI. YOU’VE MADE YOUR BED—THE INESCAPABILITY OF GAY MARRIAGE
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose on a minority must
be imposed generally.  Conversely, nothing opens the door to ar-
bitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them
if larger numbers were affected.  Courts can take no better mea-
sure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
equal in operation.261
Is divorce a component of marriage, or merely a corollary?  Will the
Supreme Court consider divorce as part of the rights associated with mar-
riage?  The answers to these questions are critical, especially to the gay
community that has a very limited, regional right to legally marry.262  If
divorce is a corollary to marriage, if divorce is part of the bundle of marital
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. See generally RILEY, supra note 11, at 185 (“A life-long marriage can be
held as a societal ideal, a goal, a standard to be worked toward, while divorce provi-
sions can end disintegrating marriages incapable of achieving the ideal.”).
261. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
262. Ironically, the regional nature of this right mirrors quite closely the in-
terracial struggle for marital equality.  Southern politicians urged protection, even
national protection at times, against interracial marriage.  One of the more dis-
turbing portrayals of the southern viewpoint was presented on the House Floor by
Georgia Representative Seaborn Roddenbery:
No brutality, no infamy, no degradation in all the years of southern slav-
ery possessed such villainous character and such atrocious qualities as the
provision of the laws of Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, and other
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rights, then their marital rights are as portable as the couple is.  But, if
divorce is a component of marriage, state courts may continue to treat gay
marriage, and its component right to divorce, as beyond their subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.  For these same-sex couples, the right to marry, once exer-
cised, becomes the most final act possible, taking on a sense of
permanency and inescapability that non-gay couples never
contemplate.263
Much to the consternation of the straight community, it appears that
when it comes to love, marriage, and divorce the heterosexual and homo-
sexual communities have much in common.  Both appear to desire last-
ing, committed relationships sanctioned by the state covenant of marriage.
Both appear to recognize that when marriages fail, it is the state—and the
state alone—that provides the opportunity to be released from this com-
mitment via divorce.264  And, both communities appear to appreciate that
while love and marriage are the ideal, divorce is all too often the reality.
Justice Jackson’s 1949 comments serve as a harbinger to the gay rights
struggle regarding divorce.265  If divorce is wrong for some, it must be
wrong for all.266  And, conversely, if the right to end a martial union ex-
ists—constitutionally speaking—for some, it should exist for all.267
Divorce should exist for all, not merely because Justice Jackson’s cries
for justness demand equality.  Divorce should exist for all because divorce
is a fundamental right protected under the liberty and privacy doctrines of
substantive due process.  Divorce has existed since the founding of our
nation and is undoubtedly “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”268
States which allow the marriage of the negro Jack Johnson to a woman of
the Caucasian strain.  [Applause.]
. . . .
Gentlemen, you may Africanize this great country by continuing in
Northern and Western States to sacrifice white women on the altar of the
negroes lustful fires, but thank God, there are yet 13 States beneath ceru-
lean skies that turn with yearning heart and willing hands to help you
strike it down ere it curse you, and in cursing you curse us all forever
[applause], and, in cursing you, lest it destroy you and destroy us
altogether.
49 CONG. REC. 502–03 (1912).
263. See, e.g., Trickey v. Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (pro-
tecting individuals from cruel and unusual punishment that remaining in bad mar-
riage entails).
264. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971) (basing its
decision, in part, on state’s monopoly over marital dissolution).
265. Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112–13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
266. See Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 75.  The authors sagely comment: “In-
deed, divorce is an unfortunate result of a failed marriage, not a boon offered only
to those who are legally wed.” Id. at 25.
267. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (distinguishing delay from
deprivation).
268. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (2008) (citing Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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Divorce is such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist”269 without its
presence.270  Imagine, if you can, a world where people once married are
forever married.  Forever.  Would Americans really enter into unbreakable
vows?
Marriage, littered with limitations dating back to our country’s found-
ing, is not the proper prism through which to evaluate divorce.  Rather, to
the extent that divorce is a corollary of marriage, it is more akin to the
privacy rights of contraception and abortion—they both exist as indepen-
dent rights—though their connection is indisputable.271  Women have a
right to seek to avoid pregnancy through resort to contraception.272  And,
when that attempt either fails or was improperly utilized, the Constitution
provides a qualified fundamental right to abortion to end that
pregnancy.273
Similarly, while the states have the right to qualify the fundamental
right of marriage, the only qualification to divorce that appears constitu-
tional is the limited residency requirements that states can impose.274  Be-
yond residency and domicile, there have not been any constitutionally
recognized limits to divorce as a fundamental right.275  In fact, there are
vastly more limitations placed on marriage (similar to abortion) than
there have been on divorce (similar to contraception).276  These two
rights, both fundamental constitutionally speaking, exist separate and dis-
tinct from each other.  Without marriage there is no need for divorce.
But, divorce provides a fundamental right that is both separate and severa-
ble from marriage.  Divorce, in the eyes of the Constitution, stands
independently.
269. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
270. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 185 (“If we accept the lesson of the historical
record—marriage and divorce exist in virtually all societies—we can also accept
the idea that divorce is here to stay.  We need not encourage divorce, but we can
accept and aid divorce when it occurs.”).
271. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)
(noting that “[i]t should be recognized, moreover, that in some critical respects
the abortion decision is of the same character as the decision to use contracep-
tion . . . .”).  Justice O’Connor, writing in Casey, explained that the contraception
and abortion decisions both relate to “the woman’s liberty because they involve
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human respon-
sibility and respect for it.” Id. at 853.
272. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
273. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
274. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
275. This is not to suggest that states do not have the right to determine upon
what grounds (such as cruelty, adultery, desertion, or no-fault) divorce may be
granted.  Rather, this simply notes that there have been no other constitutionally
recognized limits placed upon the grounds for divorce.
276. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 163.
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Divorce, it seems, is more American than the many rights enveloped
in the Constitution since the 1960s.277  Although contraception could be
and was proscribed completely prior to Griswold, divorce was not.278  Al-
though abortion could be outlawed and criminally punished prior to Roe,
divorce was not.  And, although marriage and adultery—particularly of the
interracial variety—could be prosecuted, and were prior to Loving, divorce
was not.
The foundational nature of divorce as a fundamental right is unques-
tionable.  Divorce came to our shores with the early colonists and remains
an American tradition more sacred, historically, and perhaps more ar-
dently heralded, than the freedom to marry.279  As one Texas court noted,
“[w]e think that such a law or policy [denying divorce] . . . would consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment and actually place one of the spouses,
in effect, in a prison from which there was no parole.”280  Divorce ensures
that individuals can dissolve unions that are damaging, stale, unfaithful,
or, modernly at least, in any matter unsatisfying.  No-fault divorce has a
pedigree as solid and enduring as the constitutional right to access contra-
ceptives, sexual intimacy, abortions, and interracial marriages.281  Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan famously noted that the only vote he regretted was
his decision to approve “no-fault” divorce.282  But approve it he did.283
277. Id. at 9–25.  The first divorce in Massachusetts occurred in 1639. Id. at
12.  The first divorce petition in Rhode Island was filed in 1644. Id. at 22.  The first
divorce in Connecticut occurred in 1655. Id. at 18.  The first New Jersey divorce
occurred in 1669. Id. at 24.  The first New York divorce was granted in 1672. Id.
The first divorce petition heard in New Hampshire was in 1681. Id. at 23.  “Bills of
Divorcement” were considered proper penalties for adultery in Pennsylvania as
early as 1681. Id. at 25.  “[B]y the early 1770s, a century-long trend was in force:
the gradual broadening of American divorce attitudes and practices . . . .” Id. at
32.  As Professor Riley notes, by “the early 1830s, divorce was already widespread.”
Id. at 34.
278. See, e.g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934) (permitting both
divorce and remarriage, despite female recipient of her dower and alimony in eq-
uitable proceeding having improperly committed adultery under District of Co-
lumbia’s divorce and remarriage proscriptions).
279. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 33 (“[T]he increasing use of divorce to end
difficult marriages [during the colonial period] established an important trend.
The growth of colonial divorce was a mere prelude to the proliferation of divorce
in the newly established United States.”).
280. Trickey v. Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
281. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 163–65.  “By August 1977, only three states
retained the adversary system of divorce.” Id. at 163.  Following California’s lead in
1970, when the no-fault law went into effect, nearly all states moved toward a non-
adversarial form of marital dissolution. Id.
282. W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT’L AFF., Fall 2009, at 81,
81.
283. See RILEY, supra note 11, at 163.  Then-Governor Reagan signed Califor-
nia’s no-fault divorce law on September 5, 1969. Id.  The law took effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1970. Id.
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And many states followed his lead. 284  Even today, Reagan remains our
only divorced, and remarried, President.285
American society could not continue without the fundamental right
to marry, divorce, and remarry.  Divorce, for better or worse, is as much a
part of marriage as rings, bridesmaids, and wedding cakes.  Just ask your
straight neighbor or co-worker.  Chances are they have exercised their
long cherished right to say, “I do.  I did.  But, I don’t anymore.”
284. See id.  Iowa, in 1971, became the next state to follow California’s no-fault
approach to divorce. Id.  But, as Professor Riley notes, nearly all the States fol-
lowed with some form of no-fault divorce. Id.
285. But see id. at 61.  While President Reagan remains our only divorced and
remarried President, President Andrew Jackson in the 1820s married a divorced
woman, Rachel Robarbs. Id.  Professor Riley suggests the fact that Andrew Jackson
was elected President even after marrying a divorced woman signaled a shift in
ideas toward marriage and divorce. Id.
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